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Abstract 
A venture capitalist (VC) needs to trade off benefits and costs when attempting to mitigate 
agency problems in their investor-investee relationship. We argue that signals of ventures 
complement the VC’s capacity to screen and conduct a due diligence during the pre-
investment phase, but its attractiveness may diminish in institutional settings supporting 
greater transparency. Similarly, whereas a VC may opt for contractual covenants to curb 
potential opportunism by ventures in the post-investment phase, this may only be effective in 
settings supportive of shareholder rights enforcement. Using an international sample of VC 
contracts, our study finds broad support for these conjectures. It delineates theoretical and 
practical implications for how investors can best deploy their capital in different institutional 
settings whilst nurturing their relationships with entrepreneurs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
VC governance structures are designed to address information asymmetry problems 
in the financial intermediation process between venture capital (VC) investors and 
entrepreneurs (representing new ventures in need of funding) (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Governance structures, however, tend to differ from country to country, mainly 
because of the impact of legal and institutional differences (e.g. Cumming, Schmidt and 
Walz, 2010). Our study examines these aspects empirically, i.e., the extent to which agency 
conflicts between entrepreneurs and VCs are resolved by the employment of mitigating 
mechanisms, and how the use of these mechanisms varies across different institutional 
settings in our multi-country sample.   
Extant empirical research on these topics exists, but has so far been either descriptive 
in nature (e.g. Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Norton and Tenenbaum 1992, 1993) or has only 
focused on the positive impact of certain practices such as security design and syndication 
(e.g. Cumming, 2006), board controls (e.g. Cumming et al., 2010), or on how these practices 
are used to address agency issues (e.g. Bellavitis, Filatotchev and Souitaris, 2017; Manigart, 
et al., 2006). Previous research, whilst mainly emphasizing the advantages of these 
mechanisms, has ignored the effect of the associated costs. Recent work on this topic has also 
relied more within rather than cross country samples (e.g. Straling, Wijbenga and Dietz, 
2011).  
This study provides a trade-off framework for the use of mitigating mechanisms in 
different contexts. Our analysis builds on this literature by examining the extent to which 
effective signaling mechanisms (specifically founders’ education and venture patents) are 
employed to address adverse selection. We further investigate the use of control rights 
 4 
(specifically board rights and veto rights) in mitigating moral hazard and how these practices 
differ across different VC markets and institutional environments.  
In the pre-investment phase, VCs begin to address information asymmetries with 
screening and due diligence procedures. Prospective entrepreneurs can mitigate these 
asymmetries with complementary signaling efforts, which will ideally separate high-quality 
ventures from their poor-quality counterparts (e.g. Connelly et al., 2011; Mas-Colell, 
Whinston and Green, 1995). A separate stream of research has also established that signaling 
by prospective entrepreneurs is effective in attracting investors in the presence of adverse 
selection (e.g. Connelly et al., 2011). Previous works of Cumming, Schmidt and Walz (2010) 
and La Porta et al. (1998) have studied the effect of corporate transparency laws on the use 
and impact of screening and due diligence mechanisms. Jia (2015) investigated the 
relationship between banking regulations and VC control rights, considering the impact of 
information asymmetries. Other studies (e.g. Nahata, Hazarika and Tandon, 2014; 
Schwienbacher, 2008) have evidenced links between VC activity, practices as well as 
performance, and institutional differences. However, prior research has so far failed to 
investigate how cross-country institutional differences affect the use of mitigating 
mechanisms (e.g. signaling) in the presence of adverse selection. One objective of this paper 
is to fill this gap. To do so, we examine how cross-country institutional differences affect the 
interaction between the perceived degree of adverse selection and the importance assigned to 
signals from prospective entrepreneurs.  
In the post-investment phase, VCs utilize mechanisms affecting the allocation of cash 
flow and control rights to protect themselves from the entrepreneurs’ opportunistic behavior 
(e.g. Hart, 2001). A large stream of literature explains how VCs can mitigate these risks by 
employing mechanisms that align the entrepreneurs’ interests with those of investors to 
ensure the optimal deployment of resources and the realization of maximum financial returns 
 5 
(Amit, Brander, and Zott, 1998; Amit, Glosten, and Muller, 1990; Bohren, 1998; Drover, 
Wood, and Payne, 2014). Moral hazard varies across countries depending on the extent to 
which shareholder rights are protected and enforced by national laws (e.g. Cumming, 
Schmidt and Walz, 2010; La Porta et al., 1998; LaPorta et al., 2000). Recent studies on 
international differences about control rights of VC investors have focused on board rights at 
the expense of other important provisions such as veto rights (Burchardt et al., 2016; 
Cumming and Johan, 2009). Our study builds on these contributions and examines the extent 
to which agency costs are mitigated by a broad range of different control rights while 
considering cross-country legal differences.  
A key strength of our study is its multi-country nature and the richness of the data 
employed for the empirical analysis. We test our hypotheses with a proprietary, hand-
collected dataset of contractual practices used in a unique sample of 265 VC investments 
with 127 portfolio companies and 40 different lead VCs in 12 countries (US, UK, Israel, 
Europe). The dataset is comprised of contractual details for each investment as well as the 
characteristics of the respective investors and founders, which allow us to examine a wide 
range of mitigating practices.  
Our study makes important contributions to the entrepreneurial finance and agency 
literature that, according to Manigart and Wright (2013), still lacks evidence on the nature, 
extent and impact of formal and informal monitoring activities of VCs. First, we show that 
VCs increasingly observe signals to screen investments when adverse selection is more 
intense. However, we also find that the importance of these signals varies with the quality of 
corporate transparency institutions across countries. Second, we show that VCs actively use 
control rights to mitigate moral hazard risks. We find that the use of control rights appears 
more valuable in institutions where these rights are enforceable, namely where shareholder 
protection is stronger. Third, our study is among the first to disentangle adverse selection 
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from moral hazard risks and associate them to mitigating mechanisms that VCs employ in 
their investment cycle – from deal origination through monitoring. We conclude by deriving 
practical recommendations how VCs can mitigate agency problems in the presence of typical 
information asymmetries.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH HYPOTHESES 
The need to cope with information asymmetries is underpinning our understanding of 
how VCs approach the pre-investment (selection) and post-investment (contracting and 
monitoring) interaction with prospective entrepreneurs. Inherent performance uncertainties 
and incentive problems associated with the funding of companies in the early phase of their 
development give rise to contractual inefficiencies related to the well-known concepts of 
adverse selection and moral hazard (Cumming and Johan, 2009).  
Pre-investment adverse selection 
In the pre-investment phase, potential inefficiencies can result from VCs allocating 
funds to sub-optimal entrepreneurial ventures, e.g. because entrepreneurs choose to withhold 
good projects (and instead only grant access to sub-standard projects to outsiders). Mas-
Colell et al. (1995: 436) theorize that such "adverse selection arises when an informed 
individual’s [e.g. the entrepreneur] trading decisions depend on her privately held 
information in a manner that adversely affects uninformed market participants [e.g. 
investors]." Entrepreneurs might decide to sell a portion of their start-ups to financial 
investors only after learning that they are not very valuable. VCs can address this problem 
with well-developed deal origination (screening and due diligence) capabilities (e.g. 
Cumming et al., 2010). These capabilities are often augmented by syndication, which leads to 
a broadening of the pool of skills and knowledge relevant for evaluating early-stage venture 
(e.g. Carter and Van Auken, 1994; Manigart et al., 2006; Brander et al., 2002).  
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Adverse selection due to information asymmetries between VCs and entrepreneurs 
results in agency costs to be borne by VCs as the principals. These come in the form of 
search and screening costs. VCs can mitigate these costs by utilizing signals from investment 
targets to gauge entrepreneurial capabilities (e.g. Connelly et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs can 
facilitate this process by “signaling information about their unobservable knowledge or 
quality through observable actions” (Mass-Colell et al., 1995: 437). These signals include the 
board profile (e.g. Filatotchev and Bishop, 2002), the investment track record (Janney and 
Folta, 2006) as well as ownership structure (Busenitz et al., 2005; Jain et al., 2008; Bruton et 
al., 2009). Observing these signals during the investment selection phase is particularly 
relevant for start-ups that are more difficult to evaluate and inspect, for example because they 
lack a finished product and validated company information. Akerlof’s (1970) well-known 
lemons problem figures prominently in this context implying that a company’s attractiveness 
as a target for VC financing depends on the degree to which the uncertainty surrounding its 
economic prospects can be resolved by venture management (e.g. Podolny, 2001).  
Founder’s characteristics serve as proxies for the quality of venture management. 
These characteristics represent important quality signals for investors faced with significant 
agency costs arising from information asymmetries via the venture and its management (e.g., 
Coff, 2002; Cohen and Dean, 2005; Jain et al., 2008; Zimmerman, 2008). A broad range of 
VC contracting literature has looked at this issue already (see Gilbert, McDougall, and 
Audretsch, 2006 for a review). Interestingly, VCs often appear to back the ‘jockey’ rather 
than ‘horse’, in the sense that founder characteristics are treated as informative signals about 
the prospects of the venture (Kaplan, Sensoy and Strömberg, 2009). Earlier studies have 
traced venture problems to a lack of depth in human capital (e.g. Bruderl et al., 1992) or other 
people issues (e.g. Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2004). Personal traits 
of entrepreneurs, such as the educational background (e.g. Sapienza and Grimm, 1997), are 
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de facto treated as proxy measures for venture quality and growth prospects (Gilbert, 
McDougall, and Audretsch, 2006).  
Education is considered an enabler for the identification and interpretation of 
information relevant for the venture as well as for the decision regarding how to deploy 
resources most effectively. Davidson and Honig (2003) for example show that a PhD 
qualification raises the likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur by 16.7%, suggesting that the 
link is due to the technical expertise acquired during the doctoral studies. In other words, 
education is treated as a formative element of the founder’s human capital in combination 
with prior professional experience (e.g. Gimeno et al., 1997). Educational attainment has a 
potentially wide impact since it shapes the entrepreneur’s career progression, which, in turn, 
leads to industry experience, social capital and ultimately financial capital.  
Signals based on venture characteristics can also mitigate agency costs when dealing 
with adverse selection problems during the pre-investment phase. Patents are particularly 
relevant in this context. They act as a quality signal to the market and potentially justify a 
value premium (e.g. Long, 2002; Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008), i.e., patents raise the venture’s 
attractiveness as an ac uisition or investment target  e g  Ali- rkk  et al., 2005). Hurdle rates 
for achieving patent awards are generally significant so that only firms with superior 
scientific or technological capabilities succeed (e.g. Powell et al., 1996). Patents can also be 
monetized via out-licensing, which contributes directly to venture growth (Helmers and 
Rogers, 2005; Pisano, 1990; Powell et al., 1996).  
Educated founders and patents make ventures more attractive investment targets 
implying higher valuations and more competition for VCs. Previous studies have shown a 
positive impact of patents on the amount of VC funding received (e.g., Baum and Silverman, 
2004; Mann and Sager, 2007), VC valuations (Lerner, 1994) and the likelihood of attracting 
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prominent VC investors (Hsu and Ziedonis, 2008). On the margin, the net benefits of these 
mitigating mechanisms increase when other information on venture prospects is scarce (e.g. 
Bruton et al., 2009). In other words, investors are willing to pay the value premium 
associated with these signals only when the information asymmetries are sufficiently 
substantial to raise the benefits gained from these signals above the costs associated with 
them. 
Summarizing the discussion so far, founder education and patents offer strong signals 
of venture quality. These signals, in turn, reduce information asymmetries between 
entrepreneurs and investors encouraging VCs to invest in a venture despite the presence of 
adverse selection problems, especially when the venture still is difficult to evaluate or lacks 
proof of concept such as a product to showcase to investors. Hence, we posit the baseline 
hypothesis that: 
H1: As the perceived degree of adverse selection risk increases, VCs are more likely 
to invest in ventures with positive quality signals such as founder education and patents 
owned by the target company. 
The cost-benefit trade-off of using different mitigating mechanisms also depends on 
the institutional environment such as differences in legal and accounting standards (Cumming 
and Walz, 2010). Financial reporting should be enforceable (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998) and 
value informative (Armstrong et al., 2005; Hand, 2005) to be relevant for investors. Even if 
privately held ventures are not mandated to make their financial statements public, they may 
do so voluntarily to build up credibility for future fundraising (Cumming and Walz, 2010).  
The literature supports the view that stronger regulations and accounting standards 
significantly and positively impact the extent and quality of voluntary reporting across 
countries (e.g. Chen, 2006). This means that in contexts with, in relative terms, stronger 
regulations and stricter accounting standards, one should also be able to observe higher levels 
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of corporate transparency or disclosures voluntarily offered by private ventures. There should 
be a greater abundance of publicly available information that investors can utilize during deal 
origination (e.g. La Porta et al., 1998), which helps to reduce information asymmetries 
between entrepreneurs and investors and thereby search as well as screening costs. 
Financing arrangements can contain fair-valuation clauses to regulate the terms of 
how assets and liabilities are to be exchanged between transacting parties. They tend to be 
more widely used in countries with stricter legal environments (Cumming and Johan, 2009; 
Cumming and Walz, 2010) and therefore with better enforceability of these provisions (La 
Porta et al., 1997, 1998). In more opaque contexts, where institutions are not as supportive of 
corporate transparency and where disclosure standards, as well as their enforcement, are 
perceived to be weak, VCs need to rely more heavily on indirect signals of venture quality.  
Therefore, in institutional environments that support greater corporate transparency, 
the net marginal benefits of investing in ventures carrying positive but costly signals are 
lowered. Conversely, VC screening and due diligence mechanisms are probably costlier to 
deploy in more opaque contexts, for instance because VCs need to rely more on personal 
networks for gathering investment-relevant information (e.g. Bruton et al., 2009). These 
arguments are summarized with the following hypothesis: 
H2: The higher the quality of a country’s institutions in support of corporate 
transparency, the less likely it is that VC investors will rely on signaling by prospective 
ventures seeking investment funding. 
Post-investment moral hazard 
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When entrepreneurs are no longer the sole owners of the venture, they may engage in 
post-investment opportunism which constitute moral hazard
1
 problems for VCs (e.g. Dobrev 
and Barnett, 2005). Lower degrees of psychological (Guth and MacMillan, 1986) and formal 
ownership (e.g. Barney, Busenitz, Fiet, and Moesel, 1996) increase the likelihood that 
founders prioritize individual self-interest over the interests of their venture (and the VCs) 
and start behaving as “agents” (e.g. Wasserman, 2006).2 This may, for instance, result in 
“window dressing” activities, thereby biasing the venture’s performance (Burchardt et al., 
2014). Alternatively, entrepreneurs may divert company funds and effort to self-serving 
activities not directly observable by the investor (Bergemann and Hege, 1998). 
These problems lead to an increase of agency costs by forcing VCs to intensify the 
monitoring and active controlling of venture management. By not being involved in the day-
to-day operations of their portfolio companies, VCs face difficulties in tracking the 
entrepreneur’s efforts and the efficiency of capital deployment. Resource constraints of new 
ventures leading to small management teams and underdeveloped internal control systems 
can exacerbate this issue (Katila and Shane, 2005; Bingham and Eisenhardt, 2011).  
VCs address the resulting risks associated with moral hazard in mainly two ways. 
First, they fill board seats and use board representation for direct monitoring (Bagley and 
Dauchy, 2008). Monitoring acts as a pre-emptive mechanism in case of moral hazard and 
helps VCs to better understand the venture. Venture monitoring often extends to operational 
                                                 
1 Mas-Colell et al. (1995) explain that in many real-world situations, post-investment agency risks not only 
involve moral hazard (also referred to as hidden actions), but also elements of hidden information (post-
contractual information asymmetry). However, in this paper, we simply refer to post-investment agency risks in 
the form of moral hazard. This is because in our study, we cannot empirically delineate between the two 
elements of post-contractual agency risk. However, we believe this to be an opportunity for future studies.  
2
 In some cases, the founders are replaced as CEOs (Hellman and Puri, 2002) in which case three kinds of 
players are involved: Managers, founders and VCs. Given that this exacerbates moral hazard issues, it does not 
affect the conclusions following from this study’s empirical results.  
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activities (Ehrlich, De Noble, Moore, and Weaver, 1994), product introductions (Hellmann 
and Puri, 2000), as well as the recruitment and dismissal of even relatively low-level staff 
(Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005).  
Second, VCs can require contractual covenants such as veto rights to cap downside 
risks. Contracts play a complementary role in shaping the entrepreneur’s behavior and reduce 
the VCs vulnerability to hold-ups and renegotiation problems in situations where direct 
monitoring does not suffice. This aspect is particularly relevant in cases where the VC does 
not control the board majority (Bengtsson, 2011). Veto rights can prevent opportunistic 
actions such as claim dilution, asset substitution, and overinvestment (Bengtsson, 2011). 
They typically cover asset sales, asset purchases, changes in control of the firm and issuances 
of new equity; they can also affect strategic decision-making including the hiring of key 
personnel, external consultants, legal and accounting advisors, as well as the release of 
information to the public (e.g. Cumming and Johan, 2008). Altogether, they have the power 
to prevent entrepreneurs from behaving self-servingly to avoid loss of control over the 
ventures’ decision making. 
Direct monitoring and the provision of strategic advice require effort. The 
implementation of these mechanisms is generally time consuming, because venture strategies 
have a tendency of changing frequently and potentially even fundamentally (Aldrich and 
Fiol, 1994). Burdensome conflicts with other investors can exacerbate this issue (Garg, 
2013). Considering that VCs generally oversee multiple investments, their capacity to engage 
in venture monitoring and consulting may be limited (Kanniainen and Keuschnigg, 2003). 
Demanding more veto rights ex ante and engaging in more monitoring ex post may also lead 
to a deterioration of the relationship between the VCs and the entrepreneur with the 
consequence of distorting the entrepreneur’s focus away from managing the venture. VCs 
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may also face costly tradeoffs if board seats and contractual rights are obtained at the expense 
of cash flow rights.  
In sum, board seats and contractual covenants protect investors against post-
investment agency risks such as moral hazard, but are costly to negotiate and implement. 
Hence, we expect that investors are more likely to demand board seats and contractual 
covenants when these risks are higher.  
H3: As the perceived degree of moral hazard risk increases, VCs are more likely to 
use risk mitigating mechanisms such as board seats and veto rights. 
Everything being equal, the mitigation of post-investment moral hazard is shaped by 
cross-country institutional differences (e.g. Cumming, 2008; La Porta et al., 1998). 
Provisions targeting the protection of minority shareholders’ and creditors’ rights are 
generally assumed to improve legal quality by making agency risk mitigation more effective 
and less costly to implement (e.g. Bruton et al., 2009). Examples include minimum dividend 
guarantees, low equity support thresholds for requesting extraordinary shareholder meetings, 
creditor consent provisions (e.g. when filing for bankruptcy reorganization) or guarantees of 
priority in the distribution of the proceeds following the disposal of a firm’s assets in case of 
bankruptcy.  
Considering the costs involved in negotiating mechanisms such as board oversight 
and veto rights, these are more likely to be deployed in legal environments where their 
efficacy is high (i.e. where shareholder protection is prominent) and the opposite holds when 
legal standards are weak. In the latter case, there are few incentives for investors to negotiate 
contractual mechanisms that they might not be able to enforce. The next hypothesis follows. 
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H4: The higher the quality of a country’s legal standards in support of shareholder 
protection, the more likely it is that VC investors will rely on mechanisms such as 
board seats and veto rights. 
Figure 1 summarizes our theoretical framework. 
------ Insert Figure 1 about here ------ 
METHODS 
Sample and Data Collection 
 The dataset used in this study represents a hand-collected sample of 265 international 
VC investments in 127 portfolio companies carried out between 1997 and 2008.
3
 Our 
objective was to assemble a diversified cross-country sample with the representation of 
different legal systems and market maturities. Among European countries, Germany has the 
highest number of investments (81), followed by United Kingdom (37), the Nordic countries 
(30), France (19) as well as other countries such as the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium 
and Austria (9). The remaining investments are in the US (65) and Israel (24). While these 
countries are similarly developed, they differ with respect to institutional traditions and 
current standards.  
 During the data collection, the authors approached VC investors with which they had a 
prior connection (directly or through the university network). VC firms were requested to 
provide various documents. Investment contracts were made available in 100% of the cases. 
Other documents included shareholder agreements (81.51%), articles of association 
(84.91%), term sheets (24.53%) business plans (48.11%) and subsequent performance 
                                                 
3
 The dataset does not cover the full range of variables for each observation implying that the number of 
observations in each model may vary. 
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information (36.23%).  
The sample included a diverse set of VCs, both small and large as well as investors 
with a national and/or international investment focus. Like past work (e.g. Ljungqvist and 
Richardson, 2003), the VC selection is not random and limited to VCs to which the authors 
had a prior link and with sufficient interest in academic research. This may imply a selection 
bias (e.g. towards more sophisticated investors), but its scale promises to be negligible given 
the large number of lead investors (40) and VCs (314, including all syndicate members) in 
the sample. Another selection bias may result from the fact that the contracts have been 
provided by only 12 VCs with one secondary investor providing 142 of the 265 contracts that 
have been acquired from 4 different corporate venture capitalists. Again, this does not present 
a serious issue. 110 of these investments were carried out before the portfolio acquisition by 
the VC in question and, of those, only 93 involved the investment of one of the corporate 
VCs. In addition, corporate VCs were generally not lead investors and divested of their 
portfolios because of a change of strategic direction of the parent corporation. This also 
reduces the potential for performance bias. Table 1 summarizes the sample based on 
geography, year, stage of investment and round number.  
------------ Insert Table 1 about here ------------ 
 The data collection process itself considered a wide range of information in four broad 
areas: (1) general investment information (such as round number, date of investment, 
financing phase), (2) portfolio firm information (i.e., country and industry), (3) investment 
details (such as timing, staging and syndication), as well as (4) security design and control 
rights (such as management incentives and veto rights).  
 Due to the sensitive nature of the VC industry, only very few researchers have so far 
been able to analyze contracting practices with hand-collected cross-country samples (for 
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notable exceptions see Cumming, 2008; and Cumming and Johan, 2008). The dataset has 
several advantages over those used in previous studies. First, data collection by hand 
eliminates a common response bias from survey-based studies, which implies high-quality 
data and a large degree of detail. Second, the comprehensiveness of the information used in 
this study goes beyond what is customarily analyzed in the literature. Third, we are the first 
to access this kind of in-depth information across the largest VC markets in Europe and the 
US, including macro-information of each country. Few studies have had the opportunity to 
test their arguments with data offering a similar level of richness (e.g. Bienz and Walz, 2010; 
Kaplan and Stromberg, 2003; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2004; Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg, 
2007; Lerner and Schoar, 2005). However, despite its merits, our dataset may raise concerns 
of generalizability, which can be addressed by comparing the sample with those used in 
similar studies. Therefore, we compared our dataset with those analyzed by Podolny (2001), 
Bellavitis, Filatotchev and Kamuriwo (2014), Manigart et al. (2006), as well as Sapienza, 
Manigart and Vermeir (1996). Our descriptive statistics show only marginal differences that 
should not significantly endanger the generalizability of our results. 
Measures 
Pre-investment adverse selection risk reduction mechanisms 
 As previously argued, investors need to rely on alternative signals if the venture’s 
information environment is opa ue  They can look at founders’  uality, which can be proxied 
by educational background. Alternatively, they can evaluate the intrinsic quality of the 
venture’s technology, e g  by patents granted to the venture.  
 Founders’ education. In line with Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, and Henkel (2008), we 
account for the founders’ skills by measuring the highest education level attained by a 
member of the founding team. It takes values from 1 to 3 where ‘1’ represents Bachelor, ‘2’ 
Master, and ‘3’ PhD  In line with the recommendation of Agresti and Kateri (2011), this 
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measure is treated as an ordinal variable. 
 Patents. This measure captures the existence of patents within the company. It takes the 
value of ‘1’ if patents are available, and ‘0’ if not   
Post-investment moral hazard risk reduction mechanisms 
 In line with the previous discussion, investors mitigate moral hazard risk by demanding 
a larger number of board seats or by being granted more extensive veto rights.  
 VC board seats. This measure represents the percentage of board seats taken by VC 
investors. It ranges from 0 to 1 where 1 indicates that VCs control 100% of the board. 
 Veto rights. This measure captures the existence of a veto right in favor of investors. 
We collected data on the ability of investors to control changes in the venture’s core business  
The measure takes on the value of ‘1’ if such a veto right exists, implying that management 
cannot undertake significant changes to the core business without prior investor approval. It 
is set to ‘0’ otherwise   
Agency conflicts measures 
 Pre-investment adverse selection risk. Adverse selection can arise in the presence of 
pre-contracting information asymmetries between investors and founders, which are 
particularly pronounced if opportunities for venture inspection and monitoring are in some 
form restricted. To capture this effect, we define a dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
investors do not have the “right to inspect” the venture’s premises and its financial 
documents before and after the investment, and 0 otherwise. Investment uncertainty is also 
high when a venture has not yet developed a prototype. Therefore, as a robustness check, we 
consider an alternative proxy for adverse selection; it is a dummy variable which takes on the 
value of 1 if the venture did not develop a finished product yet and 0 otherwise.  
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 Moral hazard. Few empirical studies have investigated the effect of management 
opportunism related to VC investments due to the lack of adequate proxy measures. We can 
circumvent this problem by relying on the judgment of VCs directly. Risk assessments from 
investment memoranda and other VC internal documents were used to capture concerns 
regarding the  uality of venture management  scored as either a “risk” or a “strength” at the 
time of data collection). This measure directly captures perceived moral hazard risks (or lack 
thereof) with values ranging from 0 to 2: a value of ‘0’ suggests that a good management is in 
place (i.e. low moral hazard risk), a value of ‘1’ indicates that management risk is irrelevant 
and ‘2’ that management risk exists (i.e. high moral hazard risk). Hence, higher values imply 
higher risks. Considering that the dataset captures the prevalence and severity of perceived 
risks before VCs draft contracts and take measures against management risks, endogeneity is 
of no concern.   
Country differences 
 The sample includes 12 countries. To test our country-related hypotheses, we use two 
indexes of cross-country legal differences included in the World Bank database.
4
 Although 
all countries are similarly developed, they have different institutional standards. 
 Country adverse selection standards. We approximate country-specific legal standards 
related to adverse selection with the “extent of corporate transparency index” developed by 
the World Bank. This index evaluates transparency standards with respect to ownership 
stakes, compensation, audits and financial prospects, which form the basis for gauging a 
venture’s problems and prospects  Its value ranges from ‘0’ to ‘10’ with larger values 
                                                 
4
 We utilize the 2014 values of both indices as earlier measures are not available. The time discrepancy between 
investments and index values should not pose a serious issue given that legal systems are only changing very 
gradually, especially in mature countries like the ones covered in this study. 
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implying stricter corporate transparency standards. Although the transparency index might be 
more appropriate to capture dynamics related to listed companies, it is still a valid proxy for 
information asymmetries between entrepreneurs and VC investors (Kumar and Orlek, 2002) 
given that VC-backed ventures usually aim to go public. Within the countries under study, 
not surprisingly, Switzerland has the lowest transparency index with a value of 3, while the 
highest standards are in the United Kingdom (index value of 8). Country level data is linked 
to portfolio companies based on their country of incorporation, which defines the relevant 
judicial space. 
 Country moral hazard standards. The World Bank’s “extent of shareholder rights 
index” is used to measure how well a country’s legal environment protects investors against 
moral hazard risks. It is an index that evaluates shareholder rights and role in major corporate 
decisions with a scale from ‘0’ to ‘10’  Higher index values reflect more extensive 
shareholder influence (i.e., the ability to prevent and deal with opportunistic behavior). 
Within the set of sample countries, Belgium has the lowest shareholder index with a value of 
4, while the country with the highest standards is Sweden (index value of 9). As before, the 
use of country-level data is linked to where the venture is legally established.  
Control variables 
The relatively small sample size limits the number of control variables that can be 
included in the analysis (see also Harrell, 2001). We control for the amount of VC 
investments. This measure represents the total VC investments carried out in the country of 
the focal company in the year when it received VC funding as reported in the Thomson One 
Banker database (previously Venture Expert). The Thomson database is a comprehensive 
source of VC information and has been extensively used in the VC literature (e.g. Bellavitis 
et al., 2017). We expect this measure to have a negative impact on both types of dependent 
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variables. First, when VCs invest in a larger number of start-ups, they will face time 
constraints to oversee all their investments and, therefore, will have fewer resources to 
monitor the start-ups.
5
 Second, this is a measure of competition among investors. When more 
capital is chasing start-ups, VCs will compete against each other demanding less rights and 
becoming less selective since it will be more difficult to invest in ventures carrying strong 
and positive signals.  
We also control for external factors with a dot com variable, which has been adopted 
by Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) and Levis (2011) as well. This is a dummy that takes 
on the value 1 for investments carried out between 1999 and 2000 when the dot.com market 
was “hot”, and 0 in other years. The underlying conjecture is that dot.com bubble was a phase 
of investor exuberance and munificence that led to VCs having less bargaining power. Hence, 
the expected impact on both mechanisms should be negative. 
We further control for venture-related factors that may affect both pre- and post-
investment agency risks. We include venture age (in months). The expectation is that venture 
age reduces information asymmetries and therefore should reduce the use of adverse 
selection (pre-investment) mechanisms such as founders’ education. On the other hand, 
substantial resources are necessary to develop patents, and therefore we expect mature 
ventures to have more patents. Further, we expect a positive relationship between age and 
moral hazard mechanisms. The potential misallocation of effort by the founder, who has an 
incentive to accumulate private benefits at the expense of the VC investor, is likely to 
increase as the venture develops and the founder’s e uity share shrinks  As the venture 
grows, entrepreneurs have more resources under their control but own a smaller share of total 
equity. We also include a control that captures whether the venture operates in the Life 
Science industry (dummy variable). This measure reflects the different degree of riskiness 
                                                 
5
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. 
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and uncertainty that surrounds life science ventures. We further expect that more patents are 
granted to science-related ventures, and that these ventures are managed by more educated 
founders due to the research-intensive nature of the industry. As a robustness test, we also 
included a dummy related to ventures operating in the Information and Communications 
Technology space; the results were unchanged. 
Finally, we control for deal-related factors, which could impact the control and 
supervision exercised by VC investors. We include distance that measures the logarithmic 
distance (in kilometers) between sample VC and venture. VCs can be assumed to exert 
control more effectively and thereby reduce agency costs when they are located closer to the 
venture (e.g. Devigne, Vanacker, Manigart and Paeleman, 2013). Conversely, we expect that 
VCs will demand more protective mechanisms when they are located further away from the 
venture. We also include a “number of VCs” measure that controls for the number of 
investors in the specific funding round. A higher number of investors should lead to more 
board seats. However, a larger syndicate has more resources to properly evaluate the venture 
and so there is less need for negotiated mechanisms. We also control for investment 
conditions such as management incentives and staged financing, which can have a positive or 
negative impact on the use of agency risk mechanisms. Wang and Zhou (2004) proposes 
complementarity between staged financing and contracting mechanisms. On the other hand, 
Zajac and Westphal (1994) suggest diminishing returns (i.e. substitutability) from additional 
governance mechanisms such as incentives and monitoring. Table 2 lists the controls 
variables, their operationalization and the expected impact on the dependent variables. 
------------ Insert Table 2 about here ------------ 
Statistical model 
 We test our hypotheses with a generalized structural equation model (GSEM) with 
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Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimations. GSEM is ideal considering that we deal with 
multiple dependent variables. GSEM also allows for potential measurement errors (Bollen, 
1989) and is more efficient in dealing with missing values, thereby helping us to preserve 
sample size in the light of the fairly low number of observations. The technique also allows 
for the use of model specifications controlling for endogeneity. Figure 2 summarizes our 
empirical model. 
------------ Insert Figure 2 about here ------------ 
RESULTS 
 Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics and correlations for the dependent and 
independent variables. The average venture is four years old. A quarter of the ventures in our 
sample belongs to the life science sector. Concerning the main variables of interest, we find 
that 66% of the ventures have patents, 48% of the investors do not have rights to inspect, and 
40% of the ventures do not have a finished product (i.e. adverse selection risk). Further, the 
highest education of the founders, on average, is between master and PhD. Finally, we find 
that the average syndicate controls 44% of the board seats and in 57% of the cases have the 
right to veto.  
 Considering that we have binary and non-binary variables, we run three different types 
of correlation analyses. While we are using the standard pairwise method to calculate the 
correlations between non-binary variables, we apply the tetrachoric method for binary 
variables and the point bi-serial method for correlations across these two general variable 
categories.
6
  A closer examination of the correlation coefficients reveals that adverse 
                                                 
6
 The Stata command Tetrachoric computes pairwise estimates of the tetrachoric correlations with the (iterative) 
maximum likelihood estimator obtained from bivariate probit using the Edwards and Edwards (1984) non-
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selection and moral hazard mechanisms tend to be used in conjunction, i.e., they appear to be 
strategic complements. If VCs can claim more board seats, then they are also successful in 
negotiating veto rights into the contracts. They are also more likely to invest in ventures 
where the founders are well educated and the ventures possess patents. We also find that VCs 
were less demanding during the dot-com bubble with respect to all these categories.  
------------ Insert Table 3 about here ------------ 
 Table 4 reports our main results based on the structural equation model outlined in 
Figure 2. First, we run a model with only the control variables included. This model is 
reported in columns 1, 3, 5 and 7. It yields the counter-intuitive finding that larger syndicates 
invest in ventures with more educated founders. In principle, larger syndicates possess better 
screening and due diligence capabilities, and therefore require a lower number of signals. 
Syndicate size may however also lead to a better deal flow implying the opportunity to invest 
in better (e.g. more educated) teams. Larger syndicates negotiate more board seats. 
Unsurprisingly, our results further show that life science ventures are run by more educated 
founders and possess more patents. As expected, the dot com bubble variable impacts all our 
dependent variables negatively, i.e., VCs. are less demanding in terms of signals and 
contractual mechanisms during this period. In a similar fashion, “VC investments” has a 
negative impact on the post-investment agency risk mitigating mechanisms. 
 As a second step, we run the model with all the main variables, i.e., we also include the 
mitigating mechanisms as controls. We find that it is significantly more likely that the 
adverse selection mitigating mechanisms (i.e. patents and educated founders) are used in 
conjunction. In contrast, we do not find a significant relationship between VC board seats and 
                                                                                                                                                       
iterative estimator as the initial value. The Stata command pbis performs a point bi-serial correlation and tests 
whether the correlation coefficient is significantly different from zero. 
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veto rights. In columns 2 and 4, we report the results associated with our adverse selection 
hypotheses (H1-2). We posit that when these risks are high, VCs tend to invest in ventures 
with positive  uality signals related to founders’ education and company’s patents  The 
results show that VCs investing in a venture with a higher level of adverse selection (both 
with “no right to inspect” and “no finished product”) select more educated founders  We, 
however, do not find a significant relationship between the level of adverse selection risk and 
the probability of investment in ventures with patents. Hence, hypothesis 1 is partially 
supported. 
  Our second hypothesis theorizes that the use of these mitigating mechanisms is 
weaker in countries with higher corporate transparency standards (i.e. country adverse 
selection standards). Transparency negatively influences investments in educated founders, 
but does not affect the prevalence of investing in ventures with patenting activity. Hence, 
only one part of hypothesis 2 is actually supported.  
 In columns 6 and 8 we report the results associated with our post-investment moral 
hazard risk hypotheses (H3-4). Our third hypothesis posits that when this risk is high, VCs 
are more likely to use risk mitigating mechanisms such as board seats and veto rights. The 
results partially support this hypothesis. In column 6, we find that moral hazard risk 
significantly increases the share of board seats controlled by investors. A similar pattern, 
albeit not significant, is found in relation to VC veto rights. Hence, the results lend partial 
support to hypothesis 3 as well.  
 Hypothesis 4 theorizes that better legal protection of shareholder rights (i.e. country 
moral hazard standards) encourages VC investors to use mechanisms such as board seats and 
veto rights more actively. The results lend strong support to this logic. Better shareholder 
protection leads to a higher share of board seats and more veto rights controlled by the VCs.  
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 Finally, to rule out multicollinearity, we calculated the variance inflation factors (VIFs). 
VIF averages are generally significantly below the critical mark of 10 (Kutner, Neter, 
Nachtsheim, and Wasserman 2004)  They range from 1 40  Founders’ education as 
dependent variable) and 1.46 (VC Board Seats as dependent variable) to 4.25 (VC Veto 
Rights as dependent variable) and 7 82  Patents as dependent variable)  Founders’ education 
is strongly correlated with patents and, after excluding the latter, the VIF average drops to a 
more appropriate 4.55. This adjustment does not alter the general conclusions. 
------------ Insert Table 4 about here ------------ 
ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
 As previously discussed, we use two alternative measures of adverse selection and 
information asymmetries: “lack of rights to inspect” and “lack of finished product”  Both 
measures are likely to increase with information asymmetries between investors and the 
entrepreneur. In Table 4 we report the results with the inclusion of the first measure. As a 
robustness test, we proxy pre-investment adverse selection risks with the latter variable as 
well  The impact on founders’ education remains positive and significant, and the impact on 
patents becomes positive (in line with our first hypothesis) but is still insignificant. As an 
alternative measure of "founders’ education”, we use a dummy variable taking on the value 
of 1 if founders have earned a PhD. The results are not tangibly affected.  
 Further, to rule out alternative explanations, we add other control variables to the 
models presented in Table 4.
7
 First, we include additional VC characteristics in the analysis. 
We consider fixed effects for the main investor to control for the possibility that VCs prefer 
                                                 
7
 We refrain from including all these variables in the main part of our analysis. Sample size would have been 
further limited by missing observations for some of these variables. Further, including too many controls would 
reduce the variance captured by each variable in the model. For example, it is not possible to include fixed 
effects for all investors in our sample. 
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to use certain practices, regardless of the start-up’s agency costs or institutional 
characteristics. Second, we add a measure that captures the average age of the VCs involved 
in the deal; VCs might change their strategic priorities or contracting practices as they gain 
experience. Third, we include a range of additional dummies to capture VC characteristics. 
Three dummies mark the most prolific investors (with at least 25 investments) in our dataset. 
Fourth, we also add two dummy variables associated with corporate venture capital firms and 
bank-affiliated VCs. Lastly, to control for the ventures’ industry, in addition to “life science”, 
we also included a dummy related to ventures operating in the Information and 
Communications Technology space. All these analyses confirm the robustness of our main 
results. Furthermore, in some instances, we generate additional support for our third 
hypothesis  The variable “post-investment moral hazard risk” continues to have a positive 
impact on the likelihood of negotiating “VC veto rights”, but it now becomes significant at 
the 10% level. We also controlled for two additional start-up characteristics  The venture’s 
net income is used as a proxy for venture quality and the round number
8
 captures the 
resolution of investment uncertainty. The inclusion of these controls does not have a material 
impact on our results.  
DISCUSSION  
 Our study builds on past work examining the use of mitigating mechanisms in the 
VC-investee relationship on the basis of an agency cost rationale (e.g. Cumming, 2008; 
Cumming and Johan, 2009; Jia, 2015; Kaplan and Strömberg, 2003; Manigart et al., 2006). 
First, we argue that in the pre-investment phase, the VC’s own capacity to screen and conduct 
due diligence on prospective ventures seeking investment is complemented by the venture’s 
own signaling efforts (e.g. Connelly et al., 2011). We extend this argument to consider how a 
                                                 
8
 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out. 
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venture’s signaling effect diminishes (or strengthens) in response to lower (or greater) 
adverse selection problems where institutional settings support more (or less) corporate 
transparency or disclosures (e.g. Cumming et al., 2010). Second, VCs consider post-
investment moral hazard risk and may opt for contractual covenants – veto powers and board 
seats – to curb potential opportunism through monitoring (e.g. Hellman and Puri, 2002; 
Boeker and Wiltbank, 2005). We argue that this may only be truly effective in settings 
supportive of shareholder rights protection, which provide the requisite enforcement (e.g. 
Cumming et al., 2010; La Porta et al., 1997; 1998; 2000). Our study examines a wider and, to 
some extent, different set of mitigating and signaling mechanisms than those considered in 
the extant literature. We test these arguments using an international sample of VC 
investments and we find broad support for our conjectures.  
Regarding adverse selection, our baseline finding is that investors use quality signals 
of the venture (founder characteristics and patents) to mitigate these risks. These results 
buttress prior work in arguing that VCs overcome the inability to inspect or the absence of a 
finished product by other quality signals such as the entrepreneurs’ education (e.g. Kaplan, 
Sensoy and Stromberg, 2009) or the existence of patented technologies (e.g. Lerner, 1994). 
The deployment of mechanisms to mitigate agency costs must follow a cost-benefit logic. 
Investing in ventures with strong signals comes at the cost of higher valuations at the time of 
contracting (e.g. Hsu, 2004). VCs can alternatively consider any factors that make signaling 
by ventures contingently valuable (e.g. Gao et al., 2010). 
The study generates a similar conclusion for moral hazard. VC investors negotiate 
board seats and veto rights in accordance with the perceived degree of moral hazard risk. If 
VCs negotiate too forcefully at the onset and are too demanding with respect to contractual 
monitoring rights (board seats and veto powers), they may ultimately harm the entrepreneur-
investor relationship (e.g. Hellman and Puri, 2002). Doing so can also draw away attention 
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from other portfolio companies, naturally limiting the VCs’ willingness and capacity to 
engage in monitoring (e.g. Hellman and Puri, 2002). Any effort of countering the 
entrepreneurs’ propensity to behave opportunistically must reflect these opportunity costs 
implying that VCs must consider factors that reduce or increase the contingent value of 
screening or monitoring. 
This study further demonstrates that agency costs vary in response to variations in 
institutional factors, which is a research gap previously identified by the literature (e.g. 
Bellavitis, Filatotchev, Kamuriwo and Vanacker, 2017; Cumming and Johan, 2009). The 
results highlight the contingency effect of the institutional environment on the prevalence of 
VC investments. Transparency-enhancing regulations, for instance, lower the net benefits of 
VCs investing in (and paying for) ventures with stronger signals.  
We also find that the enhancement of shareholder protection incentivizes the adoption 
of monitoring mechanisms such as board seats and veto rights. Shareholder empowerment 
encourages the usage of governance mechanisms that can be used to counter opportunistic 
behavior of founder-agents. In contrast, monitoring may be too costly in legally weak 
institutional settings relative to the benefits (e.g. Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Cumming and 
Johan, 2009), which can encourage the adoption of alternative, less direct monitoring 
mechanisms (e.g. syndication) or a reassignment of cash flow rights via staging (e.g. 
Gompers, 1995) or security design (e.g. Cumming and Johan, 2009). These findings 
contribute toward a growing body of literature that jointly considers institutional factors and 
VC investments (e.g. Jia, 2015; Nahata, Hazarika and Tandon, 2014; Schwienbacher, 2008). 
Our study explains why institutional differences (e.g. related to legal standards) may 
result in substitution or complementarity effects, which is analogous to discussions of the use 
of contractual covenants in the literature (e.g. Burchardt et al., 2016). We find that signaling 
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mechanisms such as patents and founders’ education complement each other. The same 
applies to mechanisms and regulations dealing with moral hazard risks. We however also 
find that adverse selection mechanisms and legal standards have a substitutive relationship. 
This research complements previous works that emphasized the advantages of 
implementing alternative mechanisms (e.g. Manigart et al., 2006; Cumming, 2005a; 2005b; 
Cumming, 2006; Cumming and Johan, 2007). In a first step, we align the benefits of 
mitigatory and signaling mechanisms to the existence of agency risk. We then move this 
research agenda forward by arguing theoretically and supporting empirically how the 
institutional environment (corporate transparency and shareholder protection standards) 
influences the use of mitigating mechanisms for adverse selection and moral hazard.  
Our paper is novel in that it empirically disentangles moral hazard from adverse 
selection. The VC industry represents an appropriate setting for tackling this issue. Adverse 
selection is relatively more prevalent in the pre-investment phase and tends to resolve itself 
over time (Podolny, 2001), while problems of post-investment information asymmetry such 
as moral hazard and hidden information become more prevalent as the venture’s use of 
outside capital grows. This peculiarity allows us to provide evidence of the distinctive nature 
of adverse selection and moral hazard risk and, consequently, helps us to deliver insights into 
how corrective mechanisms can tackle each problem separately. The results help to open an 
avenue for further research on how investors can align their capital deployment strategies to 
reduce agency conflicts, while at the same time nurturing their relationship with the 
entrepreneurs.  
The paper suggests important policy implications as well. Our findings indicate that 
setting high corporate transparency standards, including the capacity to enforce shareholders’ 
rights, is not only beneficial to the corporate governance of large and publicly listed 
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companies, but also for the development of appropriate governance structures of smaller and 
VC-backed ventures. Strong corporate transparency laws have an indirect effect on voluntary 
disclosures of private ventures, which in turn affect agency costs imposed on VCs. By 
expanding disclosure requirements, professionalizing reporting practices and protecting the 
rights of (minority) shareholders, financial investors can monitor privately held companies 
more effectively. Therefore, strong institutional standards would be beneficial to the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem.   
Limitations and future research 
Our paper has several limitations that at the same time present opportunities for future 
research. The dataset used here provides access to a unique set of information that allows for 
an in-depth analysis of the agency costs involved in each sample transaction. While a dataset 
from secondary sources would not offer similar richness, a more broadly diversified cross-
country sample of primary contract data will. For one, it would allow the inclusion of other 
quality signals such as the endorsement of third parties (e.g. industry awards). Second, it may 
be possible to control for a wider range of macroeconomic influences such as GDP, 
unemployment or cost of capital. Third, we see the inclusion of syndicate heterogeneity 
(presence of corporate VCs, government and independents) as an interesting extension to our 
analysis. Lastly, depending on data availability, future work can study the effectiveness of 
mitigating mechanism over time, or on different variables such as venture performance.  
CONCLUSION 
It is well established that agency conflicts play a defining role in shaping the 
relationship between VC investors and entrepreneurs. We investigate potential mechanisms 
that VCs can utilize to reduce these conflicts. The main insight from this study is that 
mitigating mechanisms such as signals or contractual covenants are a double-edged sword. 
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They can help to minimize agency conflicts but are also costly to implement and negotiate. 
We show that the quality of the institutional context has a significant impact on the trade-offs 
between benefits and costs associated with the potential deployment of these mechanisms.  
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Table 1. Summary information of portfolio firms and financing rounds 
                          
Panel A. Segmentation by Geography 
  Germany U.S. U.K. Israel Sweden France Netherlands Norway Finland Switzerland Austria Belgium 
# Portfolio companies 44 25 15 11 12 9 1 4 3 1 1 1 
Relative frequency (%) 35% 20% 12% 9% 9% 7% 1% 3% 2% 1% 1% 1% 
# Financing rounds 81 65 37 24 20 19 5 5 5 2 1 1 
Relative frequency (%) 31% 25% 14% 9% 8% 7% 2% 2% 2% 1% 0.4% 0.4% 
                          
Panel B. Segmentation by year 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
# Financing rounds 2 4 18 42 40 27 33 34 30 26 8 1 
Relative frequency (%) 1% 2% 7% 16% 15% 10% 12% 13% 11% 10% 3% 0% 
                          
Panel C. Segmentation by stage               
  Seed 
Start-
up 
Early 
Stage Expansion Recap.               
# Financing rounds 13 87 109 47 9               
Relative frequency (%) 5% 33% 41% 18% 3%               
                          
Panel D. Segmentation by round number               
  1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th +               
# Financing rounds 159 62 25 9 10               
Relative frequency (%) 60% 23% 9% 3% 4%               
N=265                         
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Table 2. List of controls: Operationalization and expected results. 
Control Operationalization 
Expected impact on pre-
investment adverse 
selection mechanisms 
Expected impact on post-
investment moral hazard 
mechanisms 
Number of 
VCs 
Count of the number of 
VCs investing in the 
venture. 
Negative due to the additional 
due diligence capacities of 
multiple investors. 
Positive due to the additional 
board seats negotiated by 
larger syndicates. 
Venture Age 
Age of the venture in 
months. 
Negative on founders’ 
education due to lower 
information asymmetries in 
older ventures. Positive on 
patents due to the resources 
necessary to develop patents. 
Positive due to higher 
incentives to behave 
opportunistically.  
VC 
investments 
Number of VC 
investments in the same 
year-country of the focal 
deal. 
Negative due to softer 
investors’ selection criteria. 
Negative due to time 
investors’ time constraints 
and stronger bargaining 
power of entrepreneurs. 
Distance 
Distance in Km between 
the lead VC and the 
venture. 
Positive due to the difficulty 
in evaluating distant ventures. 
Positive due to the difficulty 
in monitoring distant 
ventures. 
Life Science 
Dummy variable 
accounting for whether the 
venture is in the life 
science industry. 
Positive due to the difficulty 
in evaluating life science 
ventures. 
Positive due to the difficulty 
in monitoring life science 
ventures. 
Incentives 
Dummy variable 
accounting for whether 
management incentive 
programs are available. 
Positive/Negative. The use of 
incentives signals investors’ 
uncertainty. Other 
mechanisms could be 
Positive/Negative. The use of 
incentives signals necessity to 
reduce moral hazard. Other 
mechanisms could be 
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considered substitutive or 
complementary. 
considered substitutive or 
complementary. 
Staged 
Financing 
Dummy variable 
accounting for whether the 
financing is disbursed in 
stages. 
Positive/Negative. The use of 
staged financing signals 
necessity to deal with adverse 
selection. Other mechanisms 
could be considered 
substitutive or 
complementary. 
Positive/Negative. The use of 
staged financing signals 
necessity to reduce moral 
hazard. Other mechanisms 
could be considered 
substitutive or 
complementary. 
Dot Com 
Dummy variable 
accounting for whether the 
investment is finalized 
during the period 1999-
2000 (dot com bubble). 
Negative due to softer 
investors’ selection criteria. 
Negative due to time 
investors’ time constraints 
and stronger bargaining 
power of entrepreneurs. 
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 Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlations    
    Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Founders' Education 2.64 (.53) 
               
2 Patents .66 (.47) .36* 
              
3 VC Board Seats .44 (.20) -0.02 .10 
             
4 VC Veto Rights .57 (.49) -.07 .05 .14* 
            
5 Number of VCs 3.79 (3.13) .16* .19* .16* -.18* 
           
6 Venture Age 48.2 (37.6) 0.06 .22* 0.06 .02 -0.01 
          
7 VC Investments 49.4 (138.1) .01 .07 
-
0.21* 
-.12 .08 .04 
         
8 Distance 5.48 (2.67) -0.03 .12 -.05 -.14* .17* .10 .23* 
        
9 Life Science .25 (.43) .35* .25 .08 .01 .09 -.09 -.18* -.13* 
       
10 Incentives .86 (.34) -.08 .14 .17* -.09 .15* .13* .13* .09 -.21 
      
11 Staged Financing .48 (.50) .10 .03 .09 .10 .04 .18* .02 -.02 .03 -.08 
     
12 Dot Com .22 (.41) -.21* -.48* -.17* -.16 -.11 -.21* .12 -.09 -.12 -.24 -.14 
    
13 
Post-Investment 
Moral Hazard Risk 
1.02 (.90) 0.11 -.03 0.12 .05 0.00 -0.08 -.11 .01 .18* -.07 -.00 -.00 
   
14 
Country Moral 
Hazard Standards 
6.76 (1.74) -.02 -.26* .16* .36* -.35* -0.07 -.50* -.39* .20* -.25* .01 .07 0.02 
  
15 
Pre-Investment 
Adverse Selection 
Risk 
.48 (.50) .12 -.11 -.07 .19 -.11 -.02 -.12 -.08 -.19 -.12 .15 .22 -.00 .14* 
 
16 
Country Adverse 
Selection Standards 
6.87 (1.04) -.13* -.04 .19* .29* -.21* -0.07 -.47* -.15* .19* -.11 .02 .05 0.13* .64* .17* 
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Table 4. Generalized Structural Equation Model with Quasi Maximum Likelihood Estimations. 
Column 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
  Dependent variables 
Founders' 
Education 
Founders' 
Education 
Patents Patents 
VC Board 
Seats 
VC Board Seats 
VC Veto 
Rights 
VC Veto 
Rights 
  Controls 
        
Number of VCs .33** (.13) .36** (.16) .11 (.07) -.05 (.08) 0.1*** (.00) .01*** (.00) -.05 (.05) .02 (.07) 
Venture Age -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .01*** (.00) .01* (.00) -.00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) 
VC investments .00 (.00) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00* (.00) -.00*** (.00) -.00 (.00) -.01*** (.00) -.00 (.00) 
Distance -.08 (.07) -.04 (.08) .07 (.06) -.01 (.08) -.00 (.00) .00 (.00) -.06 (.05) .04 (.07) 
Life Science 2.71*** (.64) 3.20*** (.75) 
1.11*** 
(.42) 
.45 (.53) -.05* (.03) -.06* (.03) -.33 (.33) -.71* (.41) 
Incentives -1.14* (.54) -1.08 (.73) .03 (.50) .16 (.56) .11*** (.04) .14*** (.04) -.07 (.42) .22 (.49) 
Staged Financing .03 (.39) .39 (.47) -.34 (.33) -.17 (.43) .04 (.02) .04 (.02) .17 (.28) .08 (.35) 
Dot Com -1.18** (.46) -1.17** (.55) -1.34 (.36) -1.18** (.48) -.04 (.03) -.04 (.03) -.34 (.35) -.52 (.40) 
Patents  1.49*** (.51)       
Founders’ Education    1.35*** (.46)     
VC Veto Rights      .01 (.03)   
VC Board Seats        .51 (.91) 
  IVs 
        
Pre-investment Adverse Selection Risk 1.66*** (.50) 
 
-.71 (.45) 
    
Country Adverse Selection Standards -.84** (.37) 
 
-.02 (.33) 
    
Post-investment Moral Hazard Risk 
    
.03** (.01) 
 
.20 (.19) 
Country Moral Hazard standards 
    
.03** (.01) 
 
.70*** (.19) 
Intercept - -  -.60 (.64) -2.39 (2.84) .34*** (.05) -.00 (.12) 1.25** (.58) -5.26*** (1.75) 
         Observations 243 230 243 217 243 230 243 217 
Log likelihood -306.56 -249.52 -306.56 -212.06 -306.56 -249.52 -306.56 -212.06 
*** p <.01, ** p < .05, * p <.1 
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Fig. 1 – Theoretical Framework 
Framework 
Venture’s signals (pre-
investment phase) 
 Founder 
characteristics 
 Venture 
characteristics 
- Provide information 
- Premium valuation  
 Institutions more supportive of 
corporate transparency 
Lower agency costs 
 Lower search costs  
 Lower screening costs 
 Lower information 
asymmetries 
 
Higher pre-investment adverse 
selection risks due to information 
asymmetries between entrepreneurs 
and investors 
Increase agency costs 
 Higher search costs 
 Higher screening costs 
Positive relationship 
Negative relationship 
 
Institutions more protective of 
shareholder rights and enforcement 
Lower agency costs 
 Control rights more effective  
 Control rights less costly to 
implement 
 Lower moral hazard 
Higher post-investment agency risks 
due to moral hazard 
Increases agency costs 
 Higher necessity to monitor  
 Higher necessity to control 
 Higher risk of opportunism 
Control rights (post 
investment phase) 
 Board rights 
 Veto rights 
- Facilitate monitoring 
- Reduce downside risk 
- Costly to implement 
and negotiate 
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Figure 2. Structure of the Generalized Structural Equation Model 
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